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Abstract: Digital deposits are undergoing exponential growth. These may in turn be exploited to support cyber 
security initiatives through open source intelligence gathering. Open source intelligence itself is a double-
edged sword as the data may be harnessed not only by intelligence services to counter cyber-crime and 
terrorist activity but also by the perpetrator of criminal activity who use them to socially engineer online 
activity and undermine their victims. Our preliminary case study shows how the security of any company 
can be surreptitiously compromised by covertly gathering the open source personal data of the company’s 
employees and exploiting these in a cyber attack. Our method uses tools that can search, drill down and 
visualise open source intelligence structurally. It then exploits these data to organise creative spear phishing 
attacks on the unsuspecting victims who unknowingly activate the malware necessary to compromise the 
company’s computer systems. The entire process is the covert and virtual equivalent of overtly stealing 
someone’s password ‘over the shoulder’. A more sophisticated development of this case study will provide 
a seamless sequence of interoperable computing processes from the initial gathering of employee names to 
the successful penetration of security measures. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The ubiquity of online social networking sites and 
the blogosphere provides a reservoir of relatively 
untapped data in terms of extracting value from their 
analysis. Many opportunities are thus presented by 
these data. Specific to security, the data may act as 
open source intelligence (OSINT) for the benefit of 
intelligence services and military strategists to 
counter cyber-crime and terrorist activity. Indeed, 
effective counter-terrorism has been deemed 
unsuccessful “without the adequate exploitation of 
open source information” (Borchgrave et al. 2006). 
Other work has integrated OSINT into the wider 
intelligence cycle in terms of crowd sourcing and the 
empowerment of the public (Steele, 2007). More 
broadly, automatic analyses have been made on 
other forms of open source information such as the 
natural language processing of social media to 
model the prediction of social tension (Vybornova et 
al., 2011) and to detect emergent conflict through 
web mining (Johansson et al., 2011). These are only 
a few examples of literature that report on the 
benefits of social media analysis to those involved in 
counter-terrorism, military strategy and social and 
political stability. Contrary to the societal benefits of 
OSINT, it can also be harnessed by those intent on 
perpetrating crime. In the remainder of this paper we 
focus on this issue and, in particular, on the coupled 
and covert processes of data mining and social 
engineering employed by the cyber-criminal to 
deceive the user into disclosing security data for 
access to computer systems. 
 
The next section introduces the phenomenon of 
social engineering and how it can be a very effective 
tool for breaching security and complementary to the 
technical hacking techniques, which are a direct 
attack on a computer system and do not involve the 
behavioural aspects of the user. Thereafter we 
present a preliminary case study, which illustrates 
the effectiveness of a covert process of intelligence 
gathering integrated into social engineering to 
compromise computer security. 
2 SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Social engineering is “the art of gaining access to 
buildings, systems or data by exploiting human 
 psychology, rather than by breaking in or using 
technical hacking techniques” (CSO Magazine, 
2012). As technology becomes more sophisticated 
and users more inter-connected as a result, virtual 
social interaction has inevitably followed on a huge 
scale. Facebook accounts for approximately 3 in 4 
minutes spent on social networking sites and 1 in 
every 7 minutes spent online around the world (The 
New Age, 2011). Moreover, digital deposits now go 
far beyond the superficial “toast and coffee for 
breakfast” type of blog. Website forums, Facebook, 
Twitter, Tumblr, Wordpress.com are all examples of 
social networking media that mobilise social 
networks and allow the expression of opinions and 
the disclosure of personal data. These data are, to 
varying degrees, public and therefore open to 
exploitation. 
 
Our inter-connected virtual society has presented 
opportunities to the malicious hacker, not only in 
terms of direct brute force attack but also in terms of 
psychological manipulation, and both contribute 
towards what is known as the vector attack in 
computer security terminology. Security of 
Information Technology has thus become a major 
concern for companies and governments. In 2010 in 
the UK, cyber-terrorism was prioritised as a Tier 
One threat to national security by the government. 
The term cyber security is widely adopted to define 
this phenomenon.  
 
In the literature, the terms social engineering and 
cognitive hacking appear to be synonymous, though 
the latter has appeared less recently since it was 
coined within a body of work by Cybenko et al. 
(2002) and Giani and Thompson (2007). Enrici et al. 
(2010) offer a discourse on the cognitive profiling of 
a computer hacker and the psychological effects of 
human factors in terms of usability and of human 
errors in terms of failure, all within the context of IT 
security. 
 
Stech (2011) confirms that there have been few 
publications that map the social and behavioural 
aspects of cyber-deception to the classical denial and 
deception tactics adopted in conventional warfare. 
Rather, the focus has been on recognising that a 
social engineering attack incorporates both technical 
and social considerations that feed on the lethargy of 
the user regarding security and the aggression of the 
malicious hacker (Abraham and Chengalur-Smith, 
2010). This combination is further endorsed by 
Maan and Sharma (2012). A framework of feedback 
loops has also been considered to model the 
manoeuvres of the attacker against those of the 
organisational countermeasures, where they 
postulate that an organisation’s technical defences 
are superior to their human equivalents (Gonzalez et 
al., 2006). The same authors argue that the key for 
the social engineer is to make the countermeasures 
transparent so that they can be incorporated into the 
main attack feedback loop, which measures the 
outcomes of each attack, in order to evaluate the 
next action to take. 
 
With specific reference to social media content, the 
use of natural language processing has been used to 
measure information assurance (Raskin et al., 2010). 
This technique applies to monitoring suspicious 
activity at social networking sites, where postings 
may exhibit inconsistency and therefore expose the 
possibility of uncovering insider threats to social 
engineering attacks. Linked to this is research 
implementing an automated social engineering bot 
attack on social media sites such as Twitter ad 
Facebook (Huber  et al., 2009). In a recent review, 
Heikkinen (2010) states how the user can be lulled 
into a false sense of security knowing that the 
company implement firewall strategies and virus 
detection, and emphasise the importance of user 
training. The focus of our paper encapsulates the 
spirit of Heikkinen’s work as well as encompassing 
the notion of the partial technical and social attack of 
other authors’ research already outlined.   
 
The next section presents our case study to illustrate 
the creative ideas behind the processes of social 
engineering to compromise security measures on a 
computer system.  
3 CASE STUDY 
The focus of the case study is on the proposed attack 
of a company with whom we have previously 
consulted. For privacy, we refer to the company as X 
hereafter. The key to unlocking the security 
measures on X’s computer system is its employees 
by exposing them to a vector attack. All employee 
data have also been made anonymous. The full 
process of how the employees may be deceived to 
disclose the necessary information to breach security 
is revealed. 
3.1 Aim 
The purpose of the case study is to demonstrate 
show how a malicious attacker, coupled with the 
 appropriate use of software tools can harness and 
integrate open intelligence gathering into the social 
engineering process to bring about a successful 
vector attack.  
3.2 The Procedure 
We adopt a sequence of events to illustrate how a 
socially engineered vector attack can be organised 
around a target. The plan of attack is as follows and 
encompasses the key stages of searching for 
employee profiles, drilling down for employee 
interests and targeting spear phishing attacks: 
 
1. Prepare the software platform to perform 
the strategic searches. 
2. Implement a covert search on company 
employees and extract detail of interest. 
3. Construct a spear phishing attack targeted 
at vulnerable employees. 
4. Propose countermeasures to the social 
engineering process. 
 
Each of the stages is considered in the remainder of 
this subsection. The first three stages illustrate the 
attack, while the last stage considers how a company 
might counter such an attack in the real world. 
3.2.1 Acquisition of Tools 
Software tools were used to effectively search 
company X’s website and affiliated online content. 
The tools were able to extract employee names, 
identify some personal interests of these employees 
and to craft a spear phishing attack based on these 
data. We used Maltego to perform the first two data 
gathering exercises and the Simple Phishing Toolkit 
to construct the email attack. Maltego is an open 
source intelligence and forensics application 
program, which is capable of mining internet 
websites, Twitter feeds and other social media 
content. The Simple Phishing Toolkit is a relatively 
new addition to the social engineer’s arsenal and 
allows the construction of a spear phishing 
campaign, which is essentially the confidence trick 
of the operation. Most importantly, the tool provides 
a website ‘scraper’ facility. This facility can 
effectively extract details from a website that is 
deemed of interest to a targeted individual and 
design an email template that appears to have been 
sent from this website. This is the crucial stage of 
deception. 
3.2.2 Covert Intelligence Gathering 
This stage proceeds with the processes of 
intelligence gathering. At this prototype stage the 
entire sequence of events is not automated and 
requires intermittent manual intervention. Company 
X’s website contains a list of employee names and 
each member of staff displays various degrees of 
personal and work-related information. We selected 
as targets only those employees who displayed 
detailed information about themselves (i.e. both 
personal and work information). The vetted list was 
then input to Maltego, using manual intervention. 
Figure 1, shows the full anonymised list of staff 
email addresses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Having assimilated a target list of employees the 
next stage was to run what are termed transforms. 
These perform the drilling down process and there 
are many options from which to choose. This case 
study made the assumption that other emails 
associated with the employees in Figure 1 would be 
a good transform to perform.  While the results for 
this transform are potentially large, Figure 2 
illustrates the returned information for one of the 
employees only. 
 
Figure 1:  The initial search on company X’s website 
extracts employee emails (anonymised). 
  
 
 
 
While the bulk of these returns did not show 
anything much of interest, other transforms based on 
common interests did. With this type of transform  
we found that many employees linked to the same 
interest such as, for example, hill walking. This 
information is invaluable to the social engineer 
planning a vector attack. Maltego offers a 
visualisation module to enhance the display of 
complex data. Using what is termed an ‘edge-
weighted view’ the visualisation in Figure 3 shows 
which of the employees link to which common 
interest. The more links to an interest the bigger the 
bubble representation. Hill walking is seen as the 
most common interest in this group of employees, 
followed by Badminton and Travel. These items are 
those that the social engineer will use to plan their 
vector attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Armed with these data, the social engineer can now 
proceed to the next stage of designing the spear 
phishing attack, which could specifically target, say, 
all those employees interested in hill walking.  
 
3.2.3 The Vector Attack 
The objective of the spear phishing attacks is to use 
the covertly gathered information from previous 
processes described in order to increase the 
likelihood of successfully penetrating the security 
system offsite.  
 
Phishing is a confidence trick to steal personal 
information, usually by email and, whilst it is not a 
new phenomenon, spear phishing is a relatively 
recent tool addition for the malicious attacker. 
Though email phishing attacks still succeed, we are 
generally much more aware in terms of recognising 
these types of attack as they adopt typical designs 
such as a generic greeting, a sense of urgency or a 
direct request for personal information. Furthermore, 
automated spam filters use these same criteria to 
intercept suspicious looking emails. However, the 
same measures fall short when encountering a spear 
phishing attack. This is because, unlike generic 
phishing attacks, they are not issued widely and 
randomly but rather they target individuals and so 
adopt a more socially aware design into their emails. 
The goal is, however, the same in that they will ask 
the receiver to click a link, which may indeed appear 
to be urgent, though related to their interests 
directly. It is the contextualising of the request 
within a personalised email that increases the 
probability of success. By targeting the individual in 
this way the attack seeks to abuse the relationship of 
trust and this falls categorically into the repertoire of 
the social engineer (Williams, 2011).  
 
Using this approach, the generic emails of phishing 
attacks have essentially been replaced with emails 
from seemingly trusted sources and by displaying 
the recipient’s name as part of the personalisation. 
The spear phisher thrives on familiarity by knowing 
your name, your address and a little about your 
personal interests (Norton, no date). So, while users 
are now more educated on phishing attacks, how 
likely are they to not click on a link that has come 
from an apparently trusted source such as a friend or 
a website used by the user for leisure activity? 
 
The Simple Phishing Toolkit allows the social 
engineer to construct a list of target individuals 
including their name, email address and groups them 
into categories related to their interests as in Figure 
4.  
 
Figure 2:  The anonymised transform results for 
emails associated with a single employee. 
Figure 3:  The bubble representation that links 
employees (anonymised) to common interests. 
  
 
 
 
The software can then generate a personalised email 
for each of the groups by using the text associated 
with an identified website template. The flavour of 
the email is personal and friendly and invites the 
targeted individual to visit their website, a bogus 
website, for further information (Figure 5). Once the 
individual has clicked the linked to the website 
malware is activated that can steal security by 
keystroke monitoring or from user activity on 
Company X’s server. In this respect there is never a 
request to the individual to disclose their security 
information directly as the malware achieves this in 
lieu of the request. The victim has thus been 
undermined. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.4 Proposal for Countermeasures 
So what could any company or other venture do to 
secure their computing infrastructure from these 
types of creative vector attacks? 
 
Firstly, it is clear from this initial case study that 
those staff members leaking professional and 
personal information are more vulnerable to a social 
engineering attack. A company should therefore 
provide the necessary education to its staff on the 
security threats (Abraham and Chengalur-Smith, 
2010; Heikkinen, 2010) that can be engineered from 
public data and to always question requests to click 
on links that were unexpected or unsolicited. While 
this study only simulated an attack on those 
interested in hill walking, any other interest 
highlighted in Figure 3 could have been used to 
similar effect. Even less suspicious would be those 
email requests that are work related and seem to 
follow the natural course of everyday working life 
rather than specific to personal interests. 
 
Taken further, a company could design and 
implement policies that prevent their staff from 
posting personal details. Without such a policy in 
place, the ‘humanising’ effect ensues, which plays 
straight into the hands of the social engineer who is 
studying the psychological behaviour of its targets in 
order to mimic them in the attack. 
 
Lastly the company could take a more aggressive 
approach by actively spear phishing their employees 
explicitly in a harmless attack in order to test their 
awareness. It in effect becomes the company drill of 
a cyber-attack as a preventative measure rather than 
a fire drill exercise, for example. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has focused on the creative process of 
cyber-attacks using the surreptitious techniques of 
social engineering. Ultimately, however, the social 
engineering attack has been identified as the top 
information security threat in 2012 (Trend Micro, 
2012). A case study was designed to simulate such 
an attack on company X’s computing infrastructure 
in order to highlight the vulnerability of disclosing 
too much data on publicly available websites. 
 
Our spear phishing email demonstrates how using 
appropriate search and mining tools and manual 
interventions, a company’s computer security could 
Figure 4:  The Simple Phishing Toolkit generates 
lists of individuals to target (anonymised). 
Figure 5: The spear phishing attack takes the form of 
a personalised email inviting the recipient to visit a 
website for further information (anonymised). 
 be compromised by exploiting personal details 
posted by the company’s staff members. 
 
By extracting an initial list of staff names and their 
associated interests it was possible, using open 
source intelligence and phishing software, to craft a 
personalised email that engendered trust in the user 
but was in fact a confidence trick to get the user to 
click on a link to a bogus website. By clicking on a 
malicious link, malware can be easily downloaded to 
the victim’s machine, in spite of existing security 
measures such as firewalls and anti-virus, which 
could steal user credentials and other valuable 
information.  
 
The work illustrates that spear phishing as opposed 
to normal phishing, is likely to be much more 
effective as they target the individual in a more 
socially aware design than the latter, which issues a 
random and blanket email attack. 
 
The case study illustrates the various stages required 
to search, extract and visualise intelligence data, 
which are invaluable to designing the spear phishing 
attack. The future requirement from this work is to 
devise an intelligent bot that can perform the entire 
sequence of events seamlessly without the manual 
intervention of the attacker. The achievement of this 
with a bot would require the integration of pattern 
recognition algorithms for text analytics as well as 
decision-making capabilities on who to target and 
how to automate the email attack effectively. 
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